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Abstract 
This paper investigates robustness problems involving non response or other nuisance 
parameters.  The minimal sufficient parameter is introduced and shown to completely 
capture the information provided by data.  The concept of informativity is then 
introduced that serves to determine, in some sense, whether statistical models provide 
any information about inferential quantities of interest.  These concepts are shown to 
lead to useful robustness results involving inferences under perfect information. 
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This paper arose out of an examination of survey problems involving non 
response.  In such problems we are faced with the dilemma of attempting to make 
inferences about some quantity of interest in the presence of nuisance parameters 
(the nuisance parameters in this case being the probability of response conditional 
on the quantity of interest).  This is nothing new.  Problems involving nuisance 
parameters abound in statistics and, within the Bayesian paradigm, present no 
more of a theoretical challenge than problems without nuisance parameters. 
 
However, in the case of survey problems involving non response it turns out 
that under a wide enough specification of possible priors we can be led to any 
inferences.  Moreover, this holds regardless of the amount of data we have 
observed.  Thus, it is clear that such problems are highly dependent upon 
assumptions regarding the propensity to respond.  Intuitively, we may feel that 
there is an inherent limit on our ability to make inferences in these cases; we may 
even feel that such problems are so sensitive to assumptions that the data really 
isn’t telling us anything at all.  So is there something fundamentally different 
about these problems from other problems involving nuisance parameters?  This 
paper answers this question (in the affirmative) and, in so doing, formalizes the 
intuitive dichotomy between problems such as non response and other problems 
involving nuisance parameters.  It shows that, in some sense, data from the former 
is uninformative about the quantities of interest, so that, even under perfect 
information our inferences are determined by our prior beliefs. 
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1. The dichotomy between likelihood and prior beliefs 
 
Let  and ( )1 2 3, , ,...x x x≡x ( )1 2, ,...,k kx x x≡x  and suppose that we are interested 
in making inferences about a quantity θ .  From Fubini’s Theorem we have: 
( ) ( ) ( ), ,k kp p dPθ π θ= π∫x x  
for any quantity ( ),θ π .  From the Representation Theorem of de Finetti (1970) we 
know that if x  is an exchangeable Polish space then there exists some quantity π  
 that the elements of so ,θ π  arex  independent and identically distributed (see also 
Fortini, Ladelli and Regazinni (2000)) leading us to the general model: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
 
 
 
1
1
, ,
         , ,
         , ,
         exp , ,
k
i
i
k k
k
x
i
k
x
i
p p dP
L dP
L dP
l dP
θ π θ π
θ π θ π
θ π θ π
θ π θ
=
=
=
=
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∫
∫
∏∫
∑∫
x
x x
π
 
where ( ) ( ),xL p x ,θ π θ≡ π  is the likelihood and ( ) ( )( ), ln ,x xl Lθ π θ≡ π
                                                          
 is the 
log-likelihood.  This result justifies working within the common Bayesian 
paradigm of a model dichotomized between likelihood and prior.  Needless to say, 
this mathematical form arises under a wide class of Bayesian models1.  Bernardo 
and Smith (1994) rightly stress that both the likelihood and prior are essential to 
the predictive model and are both the consequences of the exchangeability 
assumption.  However, this does not suggest that there are no differences between 
formulating beliefs about observables and formulating beliefs about unobservable 
parameters.  In particular, due to experience, we should expect that we are more 
adept at making judgements about quantities that are —at least in principle— 
observable than those that are not.  After all, we receive feedback, by observation, 
about the correctness of our judgments about the former, but not the latter.  Thus, 
it is not surprising that, within the Bayesian paradigm, greater debate surrounds 
the choice of an appropriate prior than the choice of an appropriate likelihood. 
 
1 Further invariance conditions (beyond exchangeability) may ensure that the likelihood takes on a 
particular parametric form. 
2. Robustness testing and perfect information 
 
Since we are not confident of our ability to make judgements about quantities 
that are not observable we are lead naturally to ask how much our conclusions 
depend upon these judgments; this leads us naturally to the concept of robustness 
testing; that is, testing the sensitivity of our inferences to our prior beliefs. 
 
Unfortunately, in a certain sense, our inferences are always highly sensitive to 
our prior beliefs.  For  and for any posterior belief  on the support for k∈` kP θ  
of  there exists a prior belief  for 
k
Lx P ( ),θ π  satisfying: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) , : ,kk L dθ π θ ,θ π θ∈∝ ∫ xAP A P π  for all .  A ( )1
It follows that, with a finite amount of data, by appropriate choice of prior belief 
we can obtain any posterior belief that is not completely contradicted by the data. 
 
To eliminate this problem, analysis of robustness proceeds according to rather 
ad hoc methods.  Instead of considering all possible prior beliefs we specify some 
narrower class of prior beliefs (which may still be extremely wide if we consider 
ourselves completely ignorant) and analyze how our inferences change for these 
different priors.  If our inferences are fairly similar regardless of which prior we 
use, then we may be confident in our analysis regardless of our confidence in our 
prior beliefs.  If our inferences are very different under different prior beliefs then 
we may not be so confident.  While helpful, this method leaves much to be desired 
in terms of certainty.  After all, did our robustness analysis depend heavily on the 
chosen class of priors, leading us to wonder about the robustness of our robustness 
analysis, and so on, ad infinitum? 
 
This shortcoming of standard robustness analysis invites us to pursue more 
objective methods of testing the sensitivity of our inferences to our prior beliefs; 
that is, methods that do not require any further assumptions —assumptions that 
may themselves induce questions of sensitivity.  Since the existence of a prior 
belief inducing a particular posterior belief is ensured only for finite observations 
it should already be evident that perfect information may hold the key. 
 
3. Minimal sufficient parameters 
 
Before attempting to develop this line of thought into an objective robustness 
test we analyze the way in which data provides us with information regarding the 
parameters.  We introduce the notion of the minimal sufficient parameter. 
 
DEFINITION 1 (Sufficient and minimal sufficient parameters): Given a 
likelihood function  with parameter xL ( ),θ π , the parameter ( ,f )φ θ π≡  is said 
to be a sufficient parameter if it is sufficient for x  and is said to be a minimal 
sufficient parameter if it is minimal sufficient for x . 
 
We first note that there is always a minimal sufficient parameter and therefore a 
sufficient parameter since the function  is itself a minimal sufficient parameter; 
in fact, Lehmann and Scheffé (1951) show that any minimal sufficient parameter 
xL
φ  is an injective (that is, one to one) function of . xL
 
3.1. Minimal sufficient parameters and inference 
 
Sufficient parameters have certain useful informatory properties which ensure 
that, in a useful sense, they completely characterize the likelihood function.  If φ  
is a sufficient parameter then we have: 
( ) ( ) ( ), ,xL f x f ,θ π φ θ= π  
by the Neyman Factorization Theorem.  It follows that: 
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so that ( ),x θ π φ⊥ .  That is, regardless of the likelihood function, the data are 
independent of the parameters given knowledge of any sufficient parameter. 
 
 
This conditional independence relation has three important consequences.  
Firstly, if φ  is a sufficient parameter, then letting ( ) ( )xL p xφ φ≡  we have: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , , ,x xL p x p x p x Lθ π θ π θ π φ φ= = = = φ   ( )2
so that the likelihood function depends upon the parameters ( ),θ π  only through 
sufficient parameters; this means that the likelihood function can be written in 
terms of any sufficient parameter. 
 
Secondly, from Fubini’s Theorem we have: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
E
i i
k k
k x x
i i
p L dP Lφ φ φ
= =
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∏ ∏∫x   ( )3
so that the predictive distribution depends upon the parameters ( ),θ π  only 
through sufficient parameters. 
Finally, from Fubini’s Theorem we have: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ), , E ,k k kp p dP pθ π θ π φ φ θ π φ= =∫x x x ( )4
)
  
so that the inferential distribution of the parameters depends upon the parameters 
( ,θ π  only through sufficient parameters.  This holds also for any function of the 
parameters.  In particular, if ( ),fτ θ π=  we have x τ φ⊥  so that: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )Ek kp p dP pτ τ φ φ τ φ= =∫x x kx   ( )5
It is pertinent to note that ( ,p )θ π φ  and ( )p τ φ  are determined by our prior 
beliefs so that these results are of fundamental importance in considering 
robustness. 
 
Since these properties hold for all sufficient parameters, it follows that the 
likelihood function and inferential distribution depend upon the parameters only 
through minimal sufficient parameters.  Thus, regardless of the form of the 
likelihood function —and thus regardless of our model assumptions— we know 
that the data provides us with information about the parameter of interest only 
through the minimal sufficient parameter. 
 
 
3.2. Minimal sufficient parameters and inference under perfect information 
 
In addition to characterizing the likelihood function, minimal sufficient 
parameters have an important asymptotic property that is of fundamental 
importance in considering robustness to prior beliefs.  This property is an 
extension of widely known asymptotic results for Bayesian statistics.  To facilitate 
these results we let ( ) (k P φ≡ ∈ xP A A )k  be our posterior beliefs about φ  and we 
let ( ) ( )lim kk∞ →∞≡P A P A  be our posterior belief about φ under perfect information. 
 
DEFINITION 2 (The Wald function): Given likelihood  that has sufficient 
parameter 
xL
φ  with range , let Φ λ  be the Wald function of φ  defined by 
( ) ( )(E xr l r )λ φ≡  and let ( ) ( )* supr rλ λ∈≡ AA  and . ( )* arg supr rλ∈ΦΦ ≡
 
THEOREM 1 (Convergence of sufficient parameters): If the elements of φx  are 
independent with likelihood  that has sufficient parameter xL φ  then —under the 
regularity conditions of Berk (1970)— if ( ) ( )* *λ λ< ΦA  then ( )( )0 1P ∞ = =P A . 
 
THEOREM 2 (Convergence of sufficient parameters): If the elements of φx  are 
independent with likelihood  that has sufficient parameter xL φ  then —under the 
regularity conditions of Berk (1970)— if *Φ  is not empty then ( )( )* 1 1P ∞ Φ = =P . 
 
PROOF: See Appendix.  ■ 
 
Theorem 2 shows that, under wide regularity conditions, our posterior belief 
about any sufficient parameter converges —under perfect information— to certain 
belief in the set of values that maximize the Wald function.  It turns out that for 
minimal sufficient parameters we have a stronger convergence result. 
 
THEOREM 3 (Convergence of minimal sufficient parameters): If the elements of 
φx  are independent with likelihood  that has minimal sufficient parameter xL φ  
then —under the regularity conditions of Berk (1970)— { }( )( )1 1P φ∞ = =P . 
 
PROOF: See Appendix.  ■ 
 
Theorem 3 shows that, under wide regularity conditions, our posterior belief 
about any minimal sufficient parameter converges, under perfect information, to 
certain belief in the true value of that parameter. 
 
4.  Informativity and perfect information 
 
We have seen that, regardless of our model assumptions, the data provides us 
with information about the parameter of interest only through the minimal 
sufficient parameter.  We have also seen that our beliefs about the minimal 
sufficient parameter will converge —under perfect information— to certain belief 
in the true value of that parameter.  Whether this information about the minimal 
sufficient parameter in turn determines the parameter of interest is determined by 
the concept of informativity. 
 
DEFINITION 3 (Informativity): A likelihood function  with minimal sufficient 
parameter 
xL
( ,f )φ θ π=  is said to be informative about θ  if there exists a function 
 such that g ( )gθ φ= . 
 
Thus, if the likelihood is informative about θ  we may determine the parameter 
of interest from our minimal sufficient statistic and so, in a sense, the data 
provides information directly about θ .  Conversely, if the likelihood is 
uninformative about θ  then we cannot determine the parameter of interest from 
our minimal sufficient statistic and so the only information about θ  provided by 
the data is through the relationship between the minimal sufficient statistic and the 
parameter of interest (which is determined by our prior beliefs). 
 
We note finally that the choice of minimal sufficient parameter φ  in the 
definition of informativity is immaterial since all minimal sufficient parameters 
are injective transformations of one another.  Using the above posterior 
convergence results, the concept of informativity leads us easily to another useful 
asymptotic result.  To facilitate this results we let ( ) ( )k kP θ≡ ∈ xG A A  be our 
posterior beliefs about θ  and we let ( ) ( )lim kk∞ →∞≡G A G A  be our posterior beliefs 
about θ  under perfect information. 
 
THEOREM 4 (Informativity and perfect information): If the elements of φx  are 
independent with likelihood  that is informative about xL θ  then —under the 
regularity conditions of Berk (1970)— { }( )( )Pr 1 1θ∞ = =G . 
 
PROOF: Follows trivially from Theorem 3.  ■ 
 
Theorem 4 shows that, if the likelihood is informative about the parameter of 
interest then, under wide regularity conditions, our posterior belief about the 
parameter of interest converges to certain belief in the true value of that parameter.  
We can see that informativity is an important property of a statistical model.  If 
our likelihood is informative then we know that the data is providing us with 
information about the parameter of interest via the minimal sufficient parameter.  
However, if the likelihood if not informative then the data is providing us with 
information that determines only the value of the minimal sufficient parameter, 
which may correspond with several possible values of the parameter of interest. 
 
An obvious test of infomativity is suggested by the above definition; namely, 
determine a minimal sufficient parameter and then determine whether the 
parameter of interest is a function of that parameter.  However, it may be difficult 
to find a minimal sufficient parameter (for a good algorithm see Johnson (1974)) 
and it may also be difficult to decide whether the minimal sufficient parameter can 
be inverted to obtain the parameter of interest.  Luckily, the following Theorem 
gives an equivalent definition that can be useful for determining informativity. 
 
THEOREM 5 (Informativity): A likelihood function  with sufficient parameter xL
( , )θ π  is informative about θ  if and only if for all θ θ′ ′′≠  and all π ′  and π ′′  we 
have ( ) (,x xL L ),θ π θ′ ′ ′′ ′′≠ π  for some x . 
 
PROOF: Without loss of generality let ( ),fφ θ π=  be a minimal sufficient 
parameter.  From the properties of minimal sufficient statistics given in Lehmann 
and Scheffé (1951) we know that ( ) ( ),x xL L ,θ π θ π′ ′ ′′= ′′  for all x  if and only if 
( ) (,f f ),θ π θ π′ ′ ′′ ′′= .  Moreover, there exists a function h  such that ( )hθ φ=  if 
and only if ( ) (,f f ),θ π θ π′ ′ ′′ ′′=  implies that θ θ′ ′′= .  The result then follows.  ■ 
 
5.  Some examples of informativity 
 
The representation Theorem of de Finetti shows that if  is exchangeable with 
elements having finite range 1 , then the elements follow a multinomial 
model with the long run proportions of outcomes as parameter (see also Fortini, 
Ladelli and Regazinni (2000)).  We can use Theorem 5 to determine whether this 
model is informative about the long run proportions. 
x
, 2,..., m
 
EXAMPLE 1: Suppose that we sample data with likelihood: 
( ) ( )
1
m
I x i
x i
i
L θ θ =
=
=∏  for mx∈`  and { }1: 1mm m iiθ θ θ+ =∈Θ ≡ ∈ =∑\ . 
To see that  is informative about xL θ  using Theorem 5 we note that for any 
θ θ′ ≠ ′′  we have ( ) ( )x xL Lθ θ′ ≠ ′′  for any { } : i ix i θ θ′ ′′∈ ≠ .  ■ 
 
Example 1 shows us that the standard multinomial model is informative for the 
parameter of the long run proportions of outcomes.  It follows from Theorem 4 
that, under perfect information, our posterior beliefs will converge to certain belief 
in the true long run proportions.  However, if instead of observing the elements of 
 directly we observe them subject to some possibility of non-response then we 
have the following model. 
x
 
EXAMPLE 2: Suppose that we sample data with likelihood: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )1
11
, 1
I x mm m
I x i
x i i i i
ii
L θ π θ π θ π
= +
=
==
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ∑∏  for 1mx +∈` , mθ ∈Θ  and . [ ]0,1mπ ∈\
To see that  is not informative about xL θ  using Theorem 5 we note that for any 
θ θ′ ≠ ′′  and ( )i i i iπ θ π θ′′ ′ ′ ′′=  we have ( ) ( ),x xL L ,θ π θ π′ ′ ′′= ′′  for all x .  ■ 
 
Example 2 shows us that in this case the model is not informative for the 
parameter of the long run proportions of outcomes.  In fact it can be shown that the 
above model has minimal sufficient parameter ( )1 2, ,..., mφ φ φ φ≡  with i i iφ θ π≡  so 
that, under perfect information, our posterior beliefs about φ  converge to certain 
belief in the true value of φ .  Since θ φ≥  perfect information restricts the possible 
range of the parameter of interest but it does not allow us to determine the 
parameter with certainty.  This property is in fact what makes non response 
problems fundamentally different from most other problems involving nuisance 
parameters.  In such problems the data gives us information, not about the 
parameter of interest, but about a minimal sufficient parameter from which we are 
unable to obtain the parameter of interest.  We have seen that, in such cases, no 
amount of data can overcome this problem.  However, if we were to place 
restrictions on the possible values of π  as part of our model we may be able to 
obtain an informative model. 
 
EXAMPLE 3: Suppose that we sample data with likelihood: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 11
1
, 1
m
I x mI x i I x m
x i
i
L θ π θ π π )= += ≠ +
=
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∏ −  for 1mx +∈` , mθ ∈Θ  and [ ]0,1π ∈\ . 
To see that  is informative about xL θ  using Theorem 5 we note that for any 
θ θ′ ≠ ′′  we have ( ) ( ), ,x xL Lθ π θ′ ′= π′  for 1x m= + .  ■ 
 
Example 3 shows us that, if we assume that the long run proportion of 
respondents of each type is the same then the new model becomes informative 
about θ .  It should therefore be obvious that the model is sensitive to this 
assumption in the sense that the absence of the assumption leaves the model 
sensitive to prior beliefs. 
This means that without this additional assumption, even under perfect 
information our inferences are sensitive to our prior assumptions.  However, with 
this additional assumption, under perfect information our inferences are not 
sensitive to our prior assumptions.  It should therefore be obvious that the model is 
sensitive to this assumption in the sense that the absence of the assumption leaves 
the model sensitive to prior beliefs.  From the perspective of robustness testing the 
question then becomes: are we confident enough in this additional assumption to 
warrant its inclusion in the likelihood model? 
 
6.  An objective robustness test 
 
The above analysis suggests that a test of informativity itself provides a useful 
test of robustness to prior beliefs.  Aside from the regularity conditions involved 
(which hold widely and can be easily tested on a case by case basis) tests of 
informativity are equivalent to tests of the asymptotic behaviour of the parameter 
of interest under perfect information; this is of direct interest in its own right.  
Moreover, tests of informativity are objective, in that they do not require any 
assumptions beyond those invariance assumptions that determine the likelihood 
function.  This is also important since it avoids raising further questions of 
sensitivity to assumptions (the avoidance of which is the point of robustness 
testing in the first place). 
 
What then are we to make of the results of such a test?  If the likelihood 
function is informative then we know that the data is providing information 
directly about the parameter of interest, and to such an extent that perfect 
information would lead to certain belief in the true parameter of interest.  This is 
all good news and we may legitimately conclude that our model is robust to prior 
assumptions.  However, if the likelihood function is uninformative then we know 
that the data is not providing us with information about the parameter of interest 
expect through the relationship between the parameter of interest and the minimal 
sufficient parameter (which is entirely determined by our prior beliefs).  We may 
therefore conclude that our model is robust to prior assumptions. 
 
The only question that may remain is the sensitivity to prior beliefs for a certain 
finite amount of data (most obviously the amount actually observed).  
Unfortunately we have seen that in answering this question any posterior belief is 
possible and supplying a ‘more practical answer’ necessarily involves the (usually 
arbitrary) limitation of the class of prior beliefs under consideration, which leads 
to further questions of sensitivity, and so on, ad infinitum. 
 
6.1. Making assumptions in order to obtain informativity 
 
We have seen that informativity is a useful and important concept in 
determining robustness and thus, in determining the degree to which we can trust 
inferences from our models.  We may even go so far as to say that we cannot trust 
inferences from uninformative models at all.  We should therefore make every 
attempt to ensure that our sampling mechanism and accompanying assumptions 
lead to a model that is informative about all parameters of interest. 
 
However, practitioners should be wary of stipulating assumptions (particularly 
about unobservable limiting quantities) merely in order to obtain informativity; 
after all, a model that is robust to prior assumption but is predicated on flawed 
likelihood assumptions is no better than a model that is sensitive to prior 
assumptions.  In cases of self selection where high non response rates can be 
expected it may be more prudent to reject data altogether and admit that no 
reliable inferences are possible rather than to churn data through a flawed model. 
 
 
Appendix 1: Convergence Theorems 
 
PROOF OF THEOREM 1: Theorem 3.3 of Berk (1970) shows that, under the 
regularity conditions specified there, if ( ) ( )* *λ λ< ΦA  then ( )( )0 1P φ∞ = =P A .  
It follows from Fubini’s Theorem that if ( ) ( )* *λ λ< ΦA  then: 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )0 0P P dP dPφ φ φ∞ ∞= = = = =∫ ∫P A P A 1  
which was to be shown.  ■ 
 
The regularity conditions for Theorem 1 are required to ensure the existence of 
the posterior distribution and to ensure that where a sequence of functions 
approach a limiting function, the arguments that maximize the latter are the limit 
of the arguments that maximize the former.  Berk (1970) gives wide conditions 
under which this occurs; Wald (1949) gives simpler but narrower conditions (see 
also Berk (1966) and Huber (1967)).  The actual result given in Berk (1970) holds 
under wider conditions than are given here; we will not have need of the wider 
theorem since the convergence of the minimal sufficient parameter does not 
always hold under the wider conditions. 
 
PROOF OF THEOREM 2: For all i∈`  let ( ) ( ){ }  *: 1i r r iλ λ≡ < Φ −A  so that 
.  From Theorem 1 we then have: ( ) (* * iλ λ< ΦA )
) 0( )(  0iP ∞ > =P A  for all i∈` . 
Since *
1 ii
∞
=Φ =∪ A  it follows that: 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )  *
1
1 1 0 1 0i i
i
P P i P
∞
∞ ∞ ∞
=
Φ = = − ∀ ∈ > ≥ − > =∑`P P A P 1A  
which was to be shown.  ■ 
 
Theorem 2 shows the convergence of our posterior beliefs about sufficient 
parameters to the set of values that maximise the Wald function.  Following a 
proof by Wald (1949) we now show that for minimal sufficient parameters the true 
value of the parameter uniquely maximises the Wald function. 
LEMMA 1: If the likelihood  has minimal sufficient parameter xL φ  then 
{ }* φΦ = . 
 
PROOF: For all r∈Φ  we have: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )E E ln xx x x
L r
r l r l
L
λ λ φ φ φ φφ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟− = − = ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 
Since φ  is minimal sufficient, it follows from Lehmann and Scheffé (1951) that 
( ) ( )x xL r L φ≠  for all r φ≠ .  It then follows from Jensen’s Inequality that: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )ln E ln 1 0xx
L r
r
L
λ λ φ φφ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟− < = =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 
so that  for all .  Thus ( ) ( )rλ φ λ> r∈Φ { }* φΦ =  which was to be shown.  ■ 
 
PROOF OF THEOREM 3: From Lemma 1 we have { }* φΦ = .  From Theorem 2 we 
then have  which was to be shown.  ■ { }( )( 1P φ∞ = =P ) 1
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